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“(A)ny conflict between an ecclesial/spiritual 
power and a political/temporal power becomes a 
political conflict at the moment it becomes the 
stake of a question of concrete self-affirmation, i. 
e. a conflict which cannot be settled by 
distinctions, however subtle they be, between the 
spiritual, the temporal, or mixt (res mixtae) but 
only in a formal way, i. e. by the answer to the 
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1 - Preliminary remark 
 
In religious symbolism, light may have a dual meaning. It is most often 
related to divine attributes and powers: In Mazdeism, light, like fire, is 
directly associated with Ormuzd, the “good” deity. In Christianity, light is 
identified with the Verb2 and may evoke the Holy Spirit, which explains 
the luminous, golden background of Orthodox icons. In Islam, a Surah 
(Chapter, no. 24) of the Koran is devoted to light and the concept of light 
                                                             
* Article peer evaluated. 
 
1 C. SCHMITT, Der Leviathan in ther Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes. Sinn und Fehlschlag 
eines politischen Sumbols, Klett-Cotta, 2003, p. 166 (referring to H. BARION, Besprechung 
des Sammelbandes, in Saggi storici intorno al Papato: dei Professori della Facoltà di Storia 
Ecclesiastica, Pontificia Università Gregoriana, Roma, 1959). 
2 JOHN, I:9. 
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plays a crucial role in Sufi tradition3. However, the act of providing light 
has also an ominous significance: in the Old Testament, the Devil is called 
“morning star, son of the dawn”4. Interestingly reminiscent of 
Prometheus, the fire-robber, Satan is the light-bearer: Lucifer, in Latin. 
In Turkish, Işık means light. Many Turks, either Sunni or Alevi, are 
called Işık. As an irony of destiny, it happened to an Alevi named Işık to 
seize the ECtHR, because he was frustrated that the domestic jurisdictions 
rejected his request that his identity card feature the word “Alevi” rather 
than the word “Islam”5. In its submissions, the Government of the secular 
republic tried to counter Işık’s claims with a myriad of interestingly 
religious arguments, coached in an ostensibly (but awkwardly) neutral, 
legalistic style. The legal debate seemed to be transposed into a religious 
battlefield, where the excessive aspirations of a presumptuous heretic met 
the opposition of public institutions, backed by religious authorities who 
draw the line between orthodoxy and heresy. The evil was fought with 
much zeal that appears hardly compatible with the republican principle of 
secularism. To exorcise this contradiction, the Government’s submissions 
were studded with frequent invocations of secularism, like repetitive 
aphorisms. 
The Işık judgment turned out to be a turning point in a series of 
cases which share the same characteristics: All were lodged by Alevis, 
involved issues related to the neutrality of the State vis-à-vis different 
religious groups and debates about secularism, revealed the conspicuous 
role of the Religious Affairs Directorate in the domestic legal system, and 
all ended up with the same conclusion: The ECtHR found a violation of 
the ECHR or its 1st Additional Protocol.  
This article proposes some reflections based on the analysis of the 
Işık judgment, its background, and the related case-law of the ECtHR 
before and after.  
 
 
2 - The Işık v. Turkey case before the European Court of Human Rights 
and its background 
 
                                                             
3 See, in general: J. CHEVALIER & A. GHEERBRANT, Dictionnaire des symboles, 
Mythes, rêves, coutumes, gestes, formes, figures, couleurs, nombres, Edition revue et 
augmentée, Robert Laffont/Jupiter, Paris, 1996, pp. 584-589. 
4 ISAIAH, XIV:12. 
5 See, Işık v. Turkey, no 21924/05, 2 February 2010. 
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In 2004, Sinan Işık applied to a court requesting that his identity card 
feature the word “Alevi” rather than the word “Islam”. Until 2006 it was 
obligatory for the holder’s religion to be indicated on the identity card, but 
since 2006 the entry could be left blank upon request. 
On 7 September 2004 the İzmir District Court dismissed the 
applicant’s request, endorsing an opinion it had sought from the legal 
adviser to the Religious Affairs Directorate, according to which the term 
“Alevi” referred to a sub-group of Islam and that the indication “Islam” 
on the identity card was thus correct. The applicant complained before the 
Court of Cassation, that he was under an obligation to disclose his beliefs 
as a result of this obligatory indication on his identity card, arguing that 
this obligation contravened both the ECHR (art. 9) and the Turkish 
Constitution (see below). The Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 
the court of first instance without any other reasoning. 
The application was lodged with the ECtHR on June 2005. In its 
judgment of 2 February 2010, the Court reiterated that the freedom to 
manifest one’s religion or beliefs had a negative aspect, namely an 
individual’s right not to be obliged to disclose his or her religion or to act 
in a manner that may enable conclusions to be drawn as to whether or not 
he or she held such beliefs. The Court did not find persuasive the 
Government’s argument that the indication of religion on identity cards 
(obligatory until 2006) did not constitute a measure that compelled 
Turkish citizens to disclose their religious convictions and beliefs. As 
regards the procedure whereby the applicant, in 2004, had unsuccessfully 
attempted to obtain the rectification of his identity card, the Court took the 
view that, since it had led the State to make an assessment of the 
applicant’s faith, it had been in breach of the State’s duty of neutrality and 
impartiality in such matters. 
The Government had contended that after the law of 2006 the 
applicant could no longer claim that he was a victim of a violation of Art. 
9, because since then all Turkish citizens had been entitled to request that 
the information about religion on their identity cards be changed or that 
the appropriate entry be left blank. The Court found that the law had not 
affected its assessment of the situation, because the fact of having to apply 
to the authorities in writing for the deletion of the religion in civil registers 
and on identity cards, and having an identity card with the “religion” box 
left blank, obliged the individual to disclose, against his or her will, 
information concerning an aspect of his or her religion or most personal 
convictions, in violation of the principle of freedom not to manifest one’s 
religion or belief. The Court pointed out that the breach in question had 
arisen not from the refusal to indicate the applicant’s faith (Alevi) on his 
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identity card but from the very fact that his identity card contained an 
indication of religion, regardless of whether it was obligatory or optional. 
The Court found, by six votes to one, that there had been a violation of 
Article 9 decided that it did not need to examine separately whether there 
had been a violation of Articles 6 and 14. 
No surprise that The Court did not find persuasive the 
Government’s arguments. For instance, referring to the Turkish 
Constitutional Court’s judgment of 21 June 1995 that will be examined 
below, the Government contends that  
 
“the mention of religion on identity cards does not affect the substance of the 
freedom of religion and belief; such a mention is based on necessities related 
to public order, general interests and social needs. There is by no means a 
compulsion exerted in order to obtain the divulgation of each person’s 
believes or to blame or inculpate a person because of his beliefs. Turkish 
Republic is a secular State where freedom of religion is expressly stipulated 
by the Constitution. […]”(§ 34).  
 
Besides, in the eyes of the Government,  
 
“the content of the identity card could not be determined according to the 
desires of each person. Given the multiplicity of denominations within Islam, 
(such as (« Hanefi », « Shafii », etc.) or of mystical orders (such as « Mevlevi 
», « Quadiri », « Naqshibandi » etc.), it is necessary not to mention various 
denominations or ramifications of the same religion in order to preserve the 
public order and the neutrality of the State […]” (§ 35) 
 
The Government associates the mention of religion with the 
necessities of public order, general interests and social needs, but does not 
specify why and how the information about religion is useful for such 
purposes. Its repetitive invocations to the principle of secularism in order 
to justify the disclosure of the religion sound irrelevant. If there is any 
relevance, it should be in the opposite sense: A secular State is supposed 
not to discriminate among different religions or denominations, and does 
not need to know about its citizens beliefs. On the other hand, the mention 
of mystical orders on the identity cards is impossible not only for technical 
reasons, but also because these orders were closed down and banned by 
virtue of a revolutionary law (No. 677/1925) enjoying special 
constitutional protection (art. 174)6. 
The applicant had claimed before domestic jurisdictions that art. 43 
of the Law no 1587 on public registration, which required the identity 
                                                             
6 For the volte-face in the Government’s defence strategy with regard to the Law no. 
677, see below “ 5 - Follow-up cases and subsequent developments”. 
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cards’ holder’s religion to be indicated was incompatible with art. 24 § 3 of 
the Constitution which provides: “No one shall be compelled to worship, or to 
participate in religious ceremonies or rites, to reveal religious beliefs and 
convictions, or be blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs and 
convictions”7. In its judgment of 21 June 19958 (related to a contention of 
unconstitutionality in a case lodged by a Bahai), referred to by the 
Government in the Işık case, the Turkish Constitutional Court had 
declared, by a majority of 6-11, that article 43 Law no 1587 was in 
conformity with articles 2 (secularism) and 24 (freedom of religion) of the 
Constitution. According to the majority’s reasoning:  
 
“The State must know its citizens’ characteristics. This need is based on 
public order and public interest, as well as on economic, political and social 
necessities. […] The information concerning the individual’s religion is 
among these characteristics and has no special meaning contradicting the 
secular structure of the State. […] The concept of secular State requires the 
neutrality of the State vis-à-vis different religions and that the State regards 
all religious beliefs on equal footing. In this context, no law provides 
different treatment and discrimination by reference to the “religion” 
indicated on the identity card. […] In the legislation, there is no distinction 
between “recognized and non-recognized religions by the State”. Within the 
conception of secular State, all religions are valid and respectable. No one 
can intervene into the belief or non-belief of others by invoking this 
conception. […] The information concerning the religion which figures on 
the identity cards […] cannot, by no means, be misused or misinterpreted in 
a way incompatible with the principle of secularism.[…] It cannot be 
inferred, from the constitutional rule “No one shall be compelled […] to 
reveal religious beliefs and convictions […]” that the religion of individuals 
cannot be registered in official records. What is prohibited by the 
Constitution is duress. The duress concerns the revelation of the religious 
beliefs and convictions. […] The concept of religious “beliefs and 
convictions” cannot be confined to the mention of religion to be written into 
the family registration as a personal or demographic information. This 
concept is broader and comprises numerous elements relating to religion and 
beliefs. […] What is prohibited by art. 24 of the Constitution is not to know 
                                                             
7 Ironically, the Constitution (art. 15 ) protects the forum internum to an extent that the 
right “not to be compelled to reveal his religion, conscience thought or belief” figures among the 
non-derogable rights in time of state of emergency. This provision is echoed by article 115 
of the Criminal Code which provides that “(1) Any person who forces another person by 
using violence or treat to disclose or change his religious, political, philosophical beliefs, 
conceptions and convictions, or prevents discloser and publication of the same, is punished with 
imprisonment from one year to three years […]”. 
8 Official Gazette No. 22433 of 14 October 1995, pp. 7 and ff.  
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an individual’s religion, but to force him to reveal his religious beliefs and 
convictions by duress. The constitutional rule that “No one shall be blamed 
or accused because of his religious beliefs and convictions” is of 
complementary and confirmative nature. […] In sum, the art. 43 in question 
comprises no provisions of compelling nature”9. 
 
Would it be farfetched to interpret the introductory statement (a 
State must know its citizens’ characteristics for reasons of public order and 
interest) as a lapsus calami revealing totalitarian tendencies? One can 
hardly follow the Constitutional Court’s reasoning. For the argument’s 
sake, let us admit that this necessity concerns only statistics, that every 
modern State can legitimately collect and keep. More imagination is, 
nevertheless, needed to understand why a staunchly secular State must 
gather data about its citizens’ religions. Furthermore, the Constitutional 
Court affirms that a secular State must be neutral vis-à-vis different 
religions and treat them on equal footing. Therefore, why does it need to 
know the citizens’ religions, since it will treat them all equally? 
The Constitutional Court reminds that no law provides different 
treatment and discrimination by reference to the “religion” indicated on 
the identity card. True, religious non-discrimination is one of the sine qua 
non conditions of secularism10. But the Constitutional Court seems to be 
satisfied with merely legal formalism, without taking the pain to check 
whether de jure equality is completed by de facto equality in daily life. In 
other words, how to explain the mystery that Alevis are underrepresented 
in public service and Non-Muslims, not represented at all? 
The Constitutional Court observes that the legislation makes no 
distinction between “recognized and non-recognized religions by the State”. If 
so, why may some religions figure in identity cards and why others have 
to raise a legal challenge in order to obtain such a right? These questions 
are maybe nonsensical, since “no procedure exists in Turkey for the 
recognition of religious denominations” as the ECtHR will observe in the 
İzzettin Doğan Case11. 
Distinction is made, by the Constitutional Court, between the 
State’s right to “know an individual’s religion” and to “force him to reveal his 
religious beliefs and convictions by duress”. What if a public official wants to 
“know” an individual’s religion and this latter refuses to reveal it, or gives 
an unwelcome response?  
                                                             
9 Official Journal No. 22433 of 14 October 1995, pp. 13-14.  
10 See H. PENA-RUIZ, Qu’est-ce que la laïcité?, Gallimard, Paris, 2003, p. 242. 
11 İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey, App. no. 62649/10, 26 April 2016, § 92. 
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Actually, in his dissenting opinion, Judge Özden, President of the 
Court, pointed out that  
 
“each legal act, especially regarding education and military service, requires 
the presentation of the identity cards by the citizens, who are therefore 
undeniably exposed to a compulsion in order to reveal their religious beliefs 
and convictions, which is precisely prohibited by art. 24 of the Constitution. 
In the same vein, citizens cannot register their new born child in the public 
register unless they specify his or her religion. Furthermore, art. 61 of the 
Penal Procedure Code requires the court to ask the witness’s religion, which 
may give rise to discrimination or even to tendencies not to appear before the 
courts”12.  
 
In their joint dissenting opinion, Judges Tüzün and Bumin 
emphasized  
 
“a secular State’s duty to prevent pressures and interventions originating 
from different sections of the society that could harm the freedom of religion 
and belief. The pressure exerted upon individuals in order to compel them to 
reveal their religion or the fact that they have no religion, may generate 
reactions or negative prejudices towards those persons. Such prejudices may 
even give rise to conflicts and disturbances in the society”13.  
 
These few judges’ realistic objection to the Court’s fallacious 
reasoning was certainly praiseworthy, but absolutely inconsequential for 
the settlement of the problem in domestic law.  
A year later, the Constitutional Court did not hesitate to blatantly 
contradict itself by founding that art. 61 of the Criminal Procedure Court, 
which required that a witness was asked to declare, inter alia, his/her 
religion before his/her first deposition before a criminal court, was 
contrary to the Constitution14. The Constitutional Court observed that: 
 
“[…] asking an individual’s religion will entail that he/she will declare 
his/her religion against his/her will, obviously violating article 24 par. 3 of 
the Constitution. The lack of any sanction for the refusal to answer such a 
question is irrelevant in that regard, since, since complying with the legal 
injunctions is a natural consequence of the rule of law principle. 
Accordingly, it is obvious that the provision in question breaches the 
                                                             
12 Official Gazette No. 22433 of 14 October 1995, pp.16-17. Judge Sezer (Ahmet Necdet 
Sezer, later president of the Republic) and Judge Acargün share, mutatis mutandis, Judge 
Özden’s opinion that art. 43 of the Law on Public Registration breaches art. 24 of the 
Constitution. (pp. 18, 20)  
13 Official Gazette No. 22433 of 14 October 1995, p. 18. 
14 Official Gazette No. 22769 of 26.09.1996, Judgment of 2 February 1996, E. S. 1995/25, 
K. S. 1996/5.  
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freedom of religion and conscience, by asking the witnesses to reveal their 
religion.” 
 
The contradiction with the previous case is striking, since the 
refusal of a witness to reveal his/her religion before the court does not 
entail any legal consequence, whereas in case of the parents’ refusal to 
provide any information about their child’s religion, the public register 
officer can reject the whole demand for registration, with all imaginable 
dramatic consequences: The new-born child shall, legally speaking, not 
exist. 
Other cases of public records requiring the mention of religious 
data have been mentioned: In October 2005, the Ministry of Public Health 
asked the personnel of some hospitals that it had newly acquired, to fill an 
information sheet, with an entry on the “denomination”15. In 2013, an occult 
administrative practice going back to 1924 was coincidentally discovered: 
“Race codes” were given to Non-Muslims in public records (Greeks: 1, 
Armenians: 2, Jews: 3, Syriacs: 4) allegedly in order to make sure that 
pupils of each community frequent only their respective schools16. Such 
practice was de facto abrogated in 201617 leaving behind a myriad of 
question marks.  
 
 
3 - The previous case-law of the ECtHR in connection with the Işık case 
 
The positions taken by the Court in its previous case-law had already 
provided hints, so that the Işık case was by no means a surprise. 
In Sofianopoulos and others v. Greece case, the ECtHR had considered 
that “an identity card cannot be regarded as a means intended to ensure that the 
adherents of any religion or faith whatsoever should have the right to exercise or 
manifest their religion”18. In sharp opposition to the story of the Işık case, in 
the Sofianopoulos case the applicants had complained that, pursuant to the 
joint decision of the Ministers of Economic Affairs and Public Order of 17 
                                                             
15 Radikal newspaper, 9 October 2005, cited by R. ENDER, “Açıklamama Hakkı”, in 
Güncel Hukuk, August 2011, p. 60. 
16 Radikal newspaper, 1 August 2013 (http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/iste-soy-kodlari-
rumlar-1-ermeniler-2-yahudiler-3-1144444/). 
17 Agos newspaper, 25 February 2016 (http://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/14473/soy-kodu-
sifahen-kalkti). 
18 Sofianopoulos, Spaïdiotis, Metallinos and Kontogiannis v. Greece, no. 1977/02, 1988/02 
and 1997/02.  
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July 2000, identity cards to be issued thenceforth to Greek citizens were no 
longer to record the bearer’s religion. They had seen in that aspect of the 
new identity cards an infringement of their right to manifest their religion. 
The Court considered that there had been no interference with the 
applicants’ right to manifest their religion and rejected the complaint as 
manifestly ill-founded.  
The Sofianopoulos case has to be read within the context of a 
particular and overheated political period of Greece, the last EU member 
State to maintain the mention of religious beliefs on official documents. 
When the Government, under the growing pressure from Brussels, 
decided to update the identity cards, the Greek Orthodox Church staged 
huge demonstrations in the streets, led by the crosier of Mgr. 
Christodoulos, Archbishop of Athens19. At the end of the day, the 
European standardization overcame the Byzantine particularity. Turkey 
and Greece share the same spirit of defiance, and attachment to their 
religious identity. A major difference is of legal nature: the Greek 
Constitution recognizes Eastern Orthodoxy as the dominant religion 
whilst Turkey is a secular state which, legally speaking, privileges no 
particular religion.  
In the Alexandridis v. Greece case (no 19516/06, 21 May 2008), the 
ECtHR observed that, the obligation imposed upon a lawyer to reveal 
before the competent court that he was not Christian Orthodox and that he 
desired to pronounce a solemn declaration instead of taking a religious 
oath, breached his right not to be compelled to manifest his religious 
convictions20. The Court considered that the freedom to manifest one’s 
religious beliefs comprises also a negative aspect, i.e. the right, for the 
individual, not to be obliged to reveal his denomination or his religious 
beliefs and not to be coerced to adopt a behaviour from which one could 
deduce that he has, or not, such beliefs. Public authorities must not 
interfere with the freedom of conscience of a person by inquiring his 
religious beliefs or by compelling him to manifest these beliefs. This 
principle is especially valid at the occasion of taking an oath in order to 
perform certain functions (§ 38). 
                                                             
19 See “Greek Church at war over plans to change ID cards” in The Guardian, 22 May 2000; 
“Religious row blazes over Greek identity” in BBC News, 15 March 2001. It is interesting to 
notice that Mgr. Christodoulos declared his suspicions about a Jewish conspiracy 
instigating moves by the government to no longer mention religious affiliations on the 
cards.  
20 Alexandridis v. Greece, 19516/06, 21 May 2008, § 41.  
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The Folgerø and Others v. Norway case (no. 15472/02, 9.6.2007) is closely 
connected to the following Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey case since it 
involved the refusal to grant full exemption from instruction in 
Christianity, religion and philosophy in State primary schools, upon 
request of the parents21. This case is also meaningful in connection with 
the Işık case, since the Court found that the system of partial exemption 
was capable of subjecting the parents to a heavy burden with a risk of 
undue exposure of their private life and that the potential for conflict was 
likely to deter them from making such requests. According to the ECtHR:  
 
“[…] information about personal religious and philosophical conviction 
concerns some of the most intimate aspects of private life. […] imposing an 
obligation on parents to disclose detailed information to the school 
authorities about their religious and philosophical convictions may 
constitute a violation of Article 8 of the Convention and possibly also of 
Article 9 (ibid.). In the present instance, it is important to note that there 
was no obligation as such for parents to disclose their own convictions. 
Moreover, Circular F-03-98 drew the school authorities’ attention to the 
need to take duly into account the parents’ right to respect for their private 
life (ibid.). The Court finds, nonetheless, that inherent in the condition to 
give reasonable grounds was a risk that the parents might feel compelled to 
disclose to the school authorities intimate aspects of their own religious and 
philosophical convictions. The risk of such compulsion was all the more 
present in view of the difficulties highlighted above for parents in identifying 
the parts of the teaching that they considered as amounting to the practice of 
another religion or adherence to another philosophy of life. In addition, the 
question whether a request for exemption was reasonable was apparently a 
potential breeding ground for conflict, a situation that parents might prefer 
simply to avoid by not expressing a wish for exemption” (§ 98). 
 
With its emphasis on the absolute respect for the forum internum, 
the Folgerø judgment undoubtedly contributed to pave the way to the Işık 
judgment. 
The Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey (no. 1448/04, 9 January 2008) 
case does not concern identity cards, but the religious identity and the 
right to education of the Alevi community. The problems observed by the 
EcTHR are symptomatic of the “identity crisis” that will lead to the 
violation of art. 9 in the Işık case.  
The violation found by the Court violation originated in the 
syllabus of religious instruction, and the absence of appropriate methods 
                                                             
21 Folgerø and Others v. Norway of 2007, 15472/02, 9.6.2007. The Court found a violation 
of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. 
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to ensure respect for parents’ convictions. The Court held that bringing the 
Turkish educational system and domestic legislation into conformity with 
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 would represent an appropriate form of 
compensation. Mr. Zengin submitted requests to the Directorate of 
National Education and before the administrative courts for his daughter, 
Eylem Zengin, to be exempted from lessons in religious culture and ethics, 
pointing out that his family were followers of Alevism. He alleged that the 
course in question was incompatible with the principle of secularism and 
was not neutral as it was essentially based on the teaching of Sunni Islam. 
All his requests were dismissed on the ground that the course in religious 
culture and ethics was in accordance with the Constitution and Turkish 
legislation. 
The applicants maintained, before the ECtHR, that the way in 
which religious culture and ethics were taught in Turkey infringed Ms. 
Zengin’s right to freedom of religion, and her parents’ right to ensure her 
education in conformity with their religious convictions as guaranteed 
under Art. 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Art. 9. They alleged that the course’s 
syllabus lacked objectivity because no detailed information about other 
religions was included, and was taught from a religious perspective which 
praised the Sunni interpretation of the Islamic faith and tradition. 
The Court found that the syllabus for teaching in primary and 
secondary schools and the relevant textbooks gave greater priority to the 
knowledge of Islam than to that of other religions and philosophies. The 
textbooks did not just provide a general overview of religions but also 
foresaw specific instruction in the major principles, tenet, practices and 
rituals of the Muslim faith. Pupils received no teaching on the confessional 
or ritual specificities of the Alevi faith, even though its followers 
represented a large proportion of the Turkish population. Information 
about the Alevis was taught in the 9th grade but the Court, like the 
applicants, considered that such information was insufficient to 
compensate for the shortcomings of the primary and secondary school 
teaching. The Court found that religious culture and ethics lessons in 
Turkey could not be considered to meet the criteria of objectivity and 
pluralism necessary for education in a democratic society and for pupils to 
develop a critical mind towards religion, and did not respect the religious 
and philosophical convictions of Ms. Zengin’s father. 
The Court examined also whether appropriate means existed in the 
Turkish educational system to ensure respect for parents’ convictions. 
Following a decision by the Supreme Council for Education of July 1990, it 
was possible for children “of Turkish nationality who belong to the Christian 
or Jewish religion” to be exempted from religious culture and ethics lessons. 
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That decision necessarily suggested that the lessons were likely to create 
conflict for Christian or Jewish children between the religious instruction 
given by the school and their parents’ religious or philosophical 
convictions. The Court considered that that situation was open to 
criticism: if the course intended to be about different religious cultures, 
there was no reason to make it compulsory for Muslim children alone. The 
fact that parents were obliged to inform the school authorities of their 
religious or philosophical convictions was an inappropriate way to ensure 
respect for freedom of conviction. The Court considered that the 
exemption procedure did not use appropriate methods and did not 
provide sufficient protection to those parents who could legitimately 
consider that the subject taught was likely to raise a conflict of values for 
their children. That was especially so where no choice had been provided 
for the children of parents who had a religious or philosophical conviction 
other than that of Sunni Islam, and where the exemption procedure 
involved the heavy burden of disclosing their religious or philosophical 
convictions. The Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 
2 of Protocol No. 1.  
Two elements of the Zengin case seem particularly relevant for the 
Işık case. Regarding the procedure for the children to be exempted from 
religious culture and ethics lessons, the Court noted that  
 
“[…] whatever the scope of this exemption, the fact that parents are obliged 
to inform the school authorities of their religious or philosophical convictions 
makes this an inappropriate means of ensuring respect for their freedom of 
conviction” (§ 75). 
 
Secondly, the Government submitted that the syllabus of the subject 
religious culture and ethics course did not take into consideration the 
teachings of members of a branch [mezhep] of Islam or a religious order 
[tarikat] represented in the country and, consequently, these topics were 
not covered. It argued that knowledge of the Alevi faith, which seemed to 
belong more to the area of philosophy, required more in-depth teaching (§ 
43). To this argument, the Court responded implicitly by reference to its 
previous case-law regarding religious autonomy:  
 
“The Court reiterates that it has always stressed that, in a pluralist 
democratic society, the State's duty of impartiality and neutrality towards 
various religions, faiths and beliefs is incompatible with any assessment by 
the State of the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those 
beliefs are expressed22. Further, the State does not need to take measures to 
                                                             
22 See Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, 26 September 1996, § 47, and Hasan and Chaush 
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ensure that religious communities remain or are brought under a unified 
leadership.23 The State’s duty to avoid “any assessment of the legitimacy of 
religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are expressed”  
 
has been determinant in the Işık case.  
 
 
3 - A new protagonist on the Strasbourg stage: The Religious Affairs 
Directorate 
 
The Işık case introduced into Strasburg’s stage a new protagonist, who 
already was present, as we have seen in Zengin case, but just behind the 
curtains: The Religious Affairs Directorate, which, in the terms of the 1982 
Constitution, “exercises its duties prescribed by its particular law, in accordance 
with the principles of secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and 
aiming at national solidarity and integrity” (art. 136)  
The Directorate had been created by the Law no 633 of 22 June 
196524. The Directorate is attached to the Office of the Prime Minister and 
is charged with carrying out the affairs related to the tenets, to the 
worshipping and moral principles of Islamic Religion, of enlightening the 
society in religious matters, and of managing worship places. The highest 
organ of decision and consultation within the Directorate is the “High 
Council of Religious Affairs” whose functions are described by art. 5 of the 
Law no. 633. The original version of the art. 5 § e cited among the 
Council’s functions: “to follow the publications, in Turkey or abroad, related to 
religion, to take the necessary steps and to prepare the principles of scientific 
struggle against adversary publications”. Since the scope of the Directorate’s 
functions is confined to Islamic religion, “adversary publications” could be 
interpreted as contrary to Islam, and the “scientific struggle”, as based on 
Islamic precepts25. This provision was abrogated, but the new art. 5 § g 
reads: “to follow the religious or scientific activities, publications or religious 
propaganda in Turkey or abroad, to evaluate them, to report the result to the 
Directorate”.  
Although Law no. 633 charges the Directorate with functions 
related to “Islamic” Religion, in practice, these functions are limited to a 
                                                                                                                                                                       
v. Bulgaria no. 30985/96, § 78. 
23 See, Serif v. Greece, no. 38178/97, §§ 51, 54. 
24 Official Journal No. 12038 of 2 July 1965. 
25 See, B. (VURAL) DINÇKOL, 1982 Anayasası Çerçevesinde ve Anayasa Mahkemesi 
Kararlarında Laiklik, Kazancı Kitap Ticaret A. Ş., İstanbul, 1992, p. 164. 
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particular denomination of Islam, the Sunna. Alevism is de facto excluded 
from the scope of activities of the Directorate, and no Alevi works at the 
Directorate as administrator, theologian, secretary or sweeper.  
In the Işık case, the İzmir District Court dismissed the applicant’s 
request, on the basis of an opinion it had sought from the legal adviser to 
the Religious Affairs Directorate, which states that the mention of 
religious interpretations or sub-cultures at the entry devoted to religion in 
identity card cannot be reconciled with national unity, republican 
principles and the principle of secularism. The “Alevi” term designates a 
sub-group within Islam and cannot be considered as an independent 
religion or a denomination (mezheb) of Islam. Alevism is an interpretation 
of Islam, influenced by Sufism, with specific cultural characteristics (§ 8). 
The Government gave a sibylline definition of the Directorate’s functions:  
 
“[The Directorate] is charged with giving opinions about questions related 
to the Islamic Religion. It functions in the respect of the principle of 
secularism, and is charged with taking into consideration the fundamental 
bases of the Islamic Religion, which are valid for all Muslims.”  
 
Besides, the Government referred to art. 10 of the Constitution (principle 
of equality and non-discrimination) in order to emphasize that the State 
has to ensure the equality of treatment for different cults and 
interpretations within the same religion (§ 35). First of all, why not to use 
the appropriate technical Islamic term “fatwa”26, instead of the wire-drawn 
“opinions about questions related to the Islamic Religion”. Secondly, what 
distinguishes “the fundamental bases of the Islamic Religion” from the “sharia, 
another well-defined Islamic concept”? And, what if a clash occurs between 
“the fundamental bases of the Islamic Religion” and the “principles of 
secularism”? Who decides in a case of divergent opinions upon “the 
fundamental bases of the Islamic Religion which are “valid for all 
Muslims”? The most probable answer is the Sunni theologians working 
within the Directorate, a State entity enjoying public power.  
In the eyes of the ECtHR, this approach is precisely what a democratic 
State, ultimate warrant of pluralism in a democratic society, has to avoid 
(§ 45). The Court refers to the Serif v. Greece case, where it had stated that: 
“Although the Court recognizes that it is possible that tension is created in 
situations where a religious or any other community becomes divided, it considers 
                                                             
26 See, Encyclopédie de l’Islam, tome II, C-G, Leyden-Paris, 1965, p. 886. Fatwa: 
“Consultation sur un point de droit (fiqh) ce terme s’appliquant, en Islam, à toutes 
matières civiles ou religieuses […]”.  
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that this is one of the unavoidable consequences of pluralism”27. The Manoussakis 
judgment reads: “The right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the 
Convention excludes any discretion on the part of the State to determine whether 
religious beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs are legitimate”28. In the 
case of Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and others v. Moldova the Court goes 
even further in saying:  
 
“In any event, the Court observes that the State’s duty of neutrality and 
impartiality, as defined in its case-law, is incompatible with any power on 
the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs, and requires the 
State to ensure that conflicting groups tolerate each other, even where they 
originated in the same group” 29. 
 
The reactions of the Religious Affairs Directorate, as well as of the 
Ministry of National Education against the aforementioned Zengin case 
reveal the underlying tensions on the Alevi issue. The Ministry declared 
that it would not change its curriculum of religious education, the Zengin 
judgment does not provide a binding guideline and Alevi pupils would not 
be exempted from the courses. The Ministry stated that European Union 
(sic) could not impose its conception of religious education to any country, 
including member States30.  
The Danıştay, (High Administrative Court) known for its 
revolutionary jurisprudence, conformed itself to the Zengin judgment in 
order to allow Alevi pupils to be exempted from lessons of religious 
education. The reaction of the President of the Religious Affairs 
Directorate, Ali Bardakoğlu, a Professor of theology by origin, was harsher 
than the Ministry of National Education:  
 
“You do not close down a hospital because there have been a few cases of 
malpractice. The High Administrative Court’s judgment does only multiply 
and amplify the errors of the ECtHR. […]. The European Court substitutes 
itself for theologians. However, the magistrates should pronounce their 
judgments according to their knowledge and to a certain methodology, and 
not according to their personal opinion”.  
 
Bardakoğlu criticized the Council of State for having neglected to consult 
the Directorate and the 23 faculties of theology existing in Turkey in order 
to solve all these problems:  
                                                             
27 Serif c. Greece, no 38178/97, 14 March 2000, § 53. 
28 Manoussakis and other v. Greece, 59/1995/565/651, 26 septembre 1996, § 47. 
29 Emphasis added. Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and others v. Moldova, no. 45701/9, 
927/03/2002 § 123.  
30 “MEB AİHM kararını önemsemedi” in Radikal, 11 October 2007.  
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“I have serious doubts about what kind of scientific data and expertise 
brought about the Council of State’s judgment that decides in religious 
matters? The most competent institution to respond to the following 
questions is, beyond doubt, the Directorate of the Religious Affairs: How 
religion is taught in Turkey? What knowledge corresponds to the common 
nucleus of all Muslim denominations? And what knowledge is peculiar to 
such or such particular denomination?”.  
 
Bardakoğlu subsequently affirmed that his Directorate did not perform its 
functions according to a particular denomination or rite, and Alevism 
should naturally be a part of the Imam-Hatip High-Schools’ curriculum31. 
The personal opinion of its President seems to be endorsed by the 
Directorate, since the Annual Report of activities of the Directorate cites, 
among the “Threats” (under the Chapter: “Evaluation of the Institutional 
Ability and Capacity”): “Certain circles’ claims for the suppression of the 
compulsory lessons of religious education”. Another pertinent threat is: 
“Efforts and activities in order to present various Islamic opinions and 
interpretations as a different religion”32. One does not need to be a 
cryptologist to decipher “certain circles” as including, in the first place, the 
ECtHR and the Turkish Council of State. To borrow from international 
humanitarian law’s language, the Directorate is involved in a conflict with 
both internal and international aspects33. In other words, it has to defend 
the purity of the faith against the assaults coming from outside, but also 
against internal deviations - these two evils becoming particularly perilous 
when in collaboration.  
 
 
5 - Follow-up cases and subsequent developments 
 
The follow-up judgments of the ECtHR affined to the Işık case are worth 
analysing in order to understand the place and the impact of this 
judgment in the case-law of the Court. As for the developments that 
emerged in Turkish domestic law in connection with the main issues of 
the Işık case, they seem to be regrettably missed opportunities.  
                                                             
31 “Danıştay’ın din dersi kararına kızdı”, in Radikal, 7 March 2008. The Imam-Hatips are 
special high-schools for the education of the Muslim clergy.  
32 Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Faaliyet Raporu, 2008, (Strateji Geliştirme Daire Başkanlığı) p. 
83 par. 1.15. 
33 International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a “Dule” 
(Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1, 
2/10/1995, § 72. 
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5.1 - ECtHR’s case law 
 
A few months after the Işık judgment, the ECtHR reaffirmed its position on 
the privacy of religious convictions in the Dimitras and Others v. Greece 
case34, where it found that the obligation, in Greece, to disclose religious 
convictions to avoid having to take religious oath in criminal proceedings 
violated art. 9 of the ECHR. The Court considered that the provisions 
concerned were difficult to reconcile with freedom of religion in so far as 
the Code of Criminal Procedure created the presumption that a witness 
was an Orthodox Christian and would take a religious oath. The very 
wording of the Code meant that people had to give details of their 
religious convictions in order to rectify that presumption and avoid 
having to take a religious oath. The law as applied in this case had obliged 
the applicants to reveal their religious beliefs in order to make a solemn 
declaration, thereby interfering with their freedom of religion (§§ 79-89). 
The Wasmuth v. Germany Judgment35 could have been interpreted as 
a deviation from the line of reasoning initiated by the Işık case, since the 
ECtHR found that the requirement to indicate on wage-tax card possible 
membership of a Church or religious society did not violated the art. 9 of 
the ECHR. However, the ECtHR justified its judgment with solid 
arguments and took care to distinguish the present case from the similar 
ones, including the Işık case: The obligation imposed on the applicant to 
provide the impugned information on his wage-tax card had constituted 
an interference with his right not to indicate his religious beliefs. 
However, that obligation had a legal basis in German law and pursued the 
legitimate aim of protecting the right of churches and religious societies to 
levy church tax. As to the proportionality of the interference, the reference 
on the tax card at issue was only of limited informative value and did not 
allow the authorities to draw any conclusions as to his religious or 
philosophical practice. The tax card was not in principle used in public, 
outside the relations between the taxpayer and his employer or the tax 
authorities. The Court did not rule out that there might be situations in 
which interference with an applicant’s right not to manifest his religious 
beliefs could appear more significant and in which the balancing of 
interests might lead it to a different conclusion (§§ 57-64). Although highly 
                                                             
34 Dimitras and Others v. Greece - 42837/06, 3237/07, 3269/07 , 3.6.2010. 
35 Wasmuth v. Germany - 12884/03, 17.2.2011. 
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criticisable, the Wasmuth judgment constitutes “a classical solution in favour 
of the untouchable State sovereignty”36. 
There is little to say about the Mansur Yalçın and Others v. Turkey 
judgment37 in which the ECtHR held, unanimously, that there had been a 
violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR because in the field of 
religious instruction, the Turkish education system was still inadequately 
equipped to ensure respect for parents’ convictions. Although significant 
changes that had been made to the curriculum in the wake of the Hasan 
and Eylem Zengin judgment, the structural problem already identified in 
that case remained unsolved. Turkey had to remedy the situation by 
introducing a system whereby pupils could be exempted from religion 
and ethics classes without their parents having to disclose their own 
religious or philosophical convictions. The Court interestingly found that 
the applicants could legitimately have considered that the approach 
adopted in the classes was likely to cause their children to face a conflict of 
allegiance between the school and their own values (§ 71). 
The case of Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfi v. Turkey38 
concerned the possibility under Turkish law for places of worship to be 
granted an exemption from paying electricity bills and the refusal to grant 
this privilege to the applicant foundation which runs, throughout Turkey, 
many cemevis, which are premises dedicated to the practice of Alevism. 
The Yenibosna Cultural Centre, houses the foundation’s headquarters and 
a cemevi. In 2006, submitting that the Yenibosna Centre was a place of 
worship for the Alevi community, its director requested exemption from 
paying electricity bills. The District Court of Beyoğlu dismissed the 
foundation’s claims, basing its decision on the Directorate’s opinion that 
Alevism was not a religion and that the cemevis were not places of 
worship. That judgment was upheld by the Court of Cassation. The 
foundation lodged an application with the ECtHR on 7 May 2010, 
complaining that, although electricity bills of places of worship were 
usually paid by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, it had been deprived 
of this privilege on account of the failure in Turkey to recognise cemevis as 
places of worship.  
                                                             
36 A. FORNEROD, “Liberté négative de religion et fiscalité cultuelle. Cour européenne des 
droits de l’homme, Wasmuth c. Allemagne, 17 février 2011” in Revue trimestrielle des droits de 
l’homme, 91/2012, p.600 
37 App. 21163/11, 16 September 2014. 
38 App. 32093/10, 2 December 2014. 
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The ECtHR pointed out that the Alevis’ free exercise of the right to 
freedom of religion was protected under Art. 9 of the ECHR and the 
Yenibosna Centre included a room for the practice of cem (series of 
liturgical, ceremonial and ritual practices), which was a basic part of the 
exercise of the Alevi religion. The cemevis were, like the other places of 
worship, premises used for religious worship and that the situation of the 
applicant foundation was similar to that of other religious communities. 
Turkish law reserved the exemption from payment of electricity bills to 
recognised places of worship and that, by excluding cemevis from the 
benefit of that status, it introduced a difference in treatment on the ground 
of religion. The Court reiterated that States enjoyed a certain margin of 
appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in 
otherwise similar situations justify a difference in treatment. Nevertheless, 
if a State introduced a privileged status for places of worship, all religious 
groups which so wished had to be offered a fair possibility of seeking the 
benefit of such status and the established criteria had to be applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner. The Court observed that the refusal of the 
applicant foundation’s request for exemption from payment of electricity 
bills had been based on an assessment by the Turkish courts on the basis 
of an opinion issued by the authority for religious affairs to the effect that 
Alevism was not a religion. However, that such an assessment could not 
be used to justify the exclusion of the cemevis from the benefit in question, 
as they were, like other recognised places of worship, places intended for 
the practice of religious rituals. The Court concluded that the difference in 
treatment sustained by the applicant foundation had no objective or 
reasonable justification and observed that the system for granting 
exemptions from payment of electricity bills for places of worship under 
Turkish law thus entailed discrimination on the ground of religion. The 
ECtHR held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Art. 14 taken 
together with Art. 9. of the ECHR. 
The case of İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey39 concerned the 
domestic authorities’ refusal to provide the applicants of Alevi faith with 
the public religious service is provided exclusively to citizens adhering to 
the Sunni understanding of Islam. The applicants had requested that the 
Alevi community be provided with religious services in the form of a 
public service; that Alevi religious leaders be recognised as such and 
recruited as civil servants; that the cemevis be granted the status of places 
of worship; and that State subsidies be made available to their community. 
                                                             
39 App. no. 62649/10, 26 April 2016. 
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Their requests were refused on the grounds that the Alevi faith is 
regarded by the authorities as a religious movement within Islam, more 
akin to the “Sufi orders”. The Court held in particular that the authorities’ 
refusal amounted to a lack of recognition of the religious nature of the 
Alevi faith and its religious practice (cem), depriving the Alevi 
community’s places of worship (cemevis) and its religious leaders (dedes) of 
legal protection and entailing numerous consequences with regard to the 
organisation, continuation and funding of the community’s religious 
activities. In the Court’s view, the Alevi faith had significant 
characteristics that distinguished it from the understanding of the Muslim 
religion adopted by the Religious Affairs Department/Directorate. The 
Court therefore found that there had been interference with the 
applicants’ right to freedom of religion and that the arguments relied on 
by the State to justify that interference were neither relevant nor sufficient 
in a democratic society. The Court further observed a glaring imbalance 
between the status conferred on the understanding of the Muslim religion 
adopted by the Religious Affairs Department/Directorate and benefiting 
from the religious public service, and that conferred on the applicants, as 
the Alevi community was almost wholly excluded from the public service. 
The Court therefore held that the applicants, as Alevis, were subjected to a 
difference in treatment for which there was no objective and reasonable 
justification. The Court held that there had been a violation of Art. 9 of the 
ECHR and a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Art. 9 of the 
ECHR. 
By no means a surprise in the light of the ECtHR’s previous case-
law, the İzzettin Doğan judgment involved a number of conspicuous 
elements which promise dramatic consequences in the future. The Court 
observes that Religious Affairs Directorate has a sort of monopoly over 
matters pertaining to the Muslim religion in Turkey (§ 26) and the Joint 
Partly Dissenting and Partly Concurring Opinion of Judges Villiger, Keller 
and Kjølbro go so far as to assert that  
 
“the Sunni interpretation of Islam - which is supported by the RAD - acts as 
a de facto “State religion” in Turkey” (§ 23). The Court “doubts whether 
the Turkish system clearly defines the legal status of religious 
denominations, and especially that of the Alevi faith” and observes that 
“the legal regime governing religious denominations in Turkey appears to 
lack neutral criteria and to be virtually inaccessible to the Alevi faith, as it 
offers no safeguards apt to ensure that it does not become a source of de jure 
and de facto discrimination towards the adherents of other religions or 
beliefs” (§ 182). 
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The Government’s reasoning is based on a peculiar conception of 
secularism which endorses the views the RAD which  
 
“performs its tasks [in accordance with the principle of secularism and] 
not by reference to the preferences or religious traditions of a particular faith 
or a particular religious group or order, but on the basis, […] of sources of 
the Muslim religion accepted by all Muslims […] these traditions and 
sources are common to all Muslims and are spiritual rather than temporal. 
Likewise, the services it provides are general and supra-denominational and 
are made available to everyone on an equal footing” (§ 27).  
 
The same interpretation of secularism appears in the judgment of 4 July 
2007 of the Administrative Court which dismissed the applicants’ claim:  
 
“As justification for that difference in treatment it observed, in particular, 
that if the State were to respond to all the expectations and demands of 
religious groups by providing a public service, this might engender a debate 
on the manner in which the religious public service was delivered by the 
RAD. There would also be a risk of breaching the principle of secularism by 
upsetting the balance between religious and legislative rule-making, and of 
restricting the exercise of the right to freedom of religion” (§ 174)40.  
 
In sum, in the public authorities’ conception, the State’s religious 
neutrality, as a prerequisite of secularism, is identified with a neutral 
interpretation, by the RAD, of Islamic traditions and sources common to 
all Muslims. Such an astonishing confusion between legal and theological 
concepts is nevertheless a constant element in the official discourse related 
to secularism. The ECtHR’s hostility to the confusion of theological and 
legal domains seems to be a determinant factor in this judgment:  
 
“The Court observes that the main argument relied on by the Government as 
justification for this difference in treatment is based on a theological debate 
concerning the place of the Alevi faith within the Muslim religion […] such 
an approach is inconsistent with the State’s duty of neutrality and 
impartiality towards religions” (§ 179). 
 
The most drastic change in the İzzettin Doğan case is certainly the volte-
face of the Government’s defence in connection with the Law no. 677 of 30 
November 1341 (1925) on the Closure of Dervish Monasteries and Tombs, 
the Abolition of the Office of Keeper of Tombs and the Abolition and 
                                                             
40 The administrative court refers to international conventions to which the Republic 
of Turkey is a Party (§ 14), including Article 18 of the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which is a United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
and not an international convention. See E. ÖKTEM, Uluslararası Teamül Hukuku, 
Istanbul, Beta, 2013, pp. 162-196. 
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Prohibition of Certain Titles, which enjoys a constitutional protection by 
virtue of art. 174 of the 1982 Constitution. When various Alevi groups and 
institutions had previously claimed, in domestic law, the right to open 
cemevis, administrative/judicial authorities rejected such claims by 
identifying Alevism to a Sufi order, and their cemevis, to the tekkes, which 
were both banned by the Law 677. In the İzzettin Doğan case too, the 
ECtHR observes that:  
 
“In many opinions the RAD has said that it regards the cemevi as a sort of 
monastery (tekke)” (§ 38). “The Government […] asserted, […] that this 
faith was simply a “Sufi order” which falls into the category of religious 
groups covered by Law no. 677” (§ 123). “[…] the refusal complained of has 
had the effect of denying the autonomous existence of the Alevi community 
and of maintaining it within the legal framework of the “banned Sufi orders 
(tarikat)” for the purposes of Law no. 677. That Law lays down a number of 
significant prohibitions with regard to these religious groups: the use of the 
title “dede”, denoting an Alevi spiritual leader, is banned, as is the 
designation of premises for Sufi practices, and both are punishable by a term 
of imprisonment and a fine” (§ 126).  
 
The ECtHR discretely points out the inconsistency of the 
Government, which, at the hearing, had stated that “Law no. 677, which had 
been enacted in the wake of the proclamation of the Republic, was no longer 
applied nowadays” (§ 84) and concludes that: 
 
“Even though, according to the Government, failure to abide by these 
prohibitions is tolerated, the fact remains that in its submissions to the 
Administrative Court the Prime Minister’s Legal Department specified 
clearly that “[t]o recognise cemevis as places of worship would be contrary to 
Law no. 677” […] Furthermore, in its judgment of 4 July 2007 the 
Administrative Court referred explicitly to the prohibitions laid down by 
that Law” (§ 126). 
 
The factual caducity of Law no. 677 has long been an obvious 
reality, as pointed out by the author of the present article in 200341, but the 
avowal of its non-application by an official agent of the Government, in 
the İzzettin Doğan judgment, is unprecedented. This can pave the way to 
the legalization and (re)institutionalization of all sorts of religious orders, 
including the Sunni ones, since the judgment tolerates no legal 
discrimination between different religious groups, whatever their 
religious status be from a theological viewpoint. In other words, any 
freedom and right recognized to Alevis would be equally enjoyable by 
                                                             
41 See, E. ÖKTEM, “La spécificité de la laïcité turque”, in Islamochristiana, 29, 2003, p. 102. 
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other religious groups. True, Law no. 677 has not been technically 
abrogated under Turkish law and remains theoretically applicable by 
domestic courts. One can, however, argue that, should a case of criminal 
condemnation by virtue of the Law no. 677 come before the ECtHR, this 
later could find a violation of art. 7 (No punishment without law) of the 
ECHR, attributing a binding force to the declaration made at the occasion 
of the İzzettin Doğan case.  
 
5.2 - Domestic law 
 
Two legal developments seem to present missed opportunities to conform 
Turkish domestic legislation to the Işık judgment. Law no. 6698 of 
24.03.2016 on the Protection of Personal Data42 cites, among the protected 
data, “religion, denomination and other beliefs” (art. 6/1). However, such 
data can be registered without the consent of the individual concerned, in 
the cases enumerated by special laws. 
Another interesting legal initiative was the implementation of the 
“Turkish Republic Identity Card Project” based on a Circular Order of the 
Office of the Prime Minister issued in 200743. The new identity cards with 
electronic chips which were distributed in a number of chosen “pilot 
zones”, included an entry for “religion”. In 2016, the minister of interior 
declared that this entry would be maintained in the new cards, but the 
inscription of any religion would be facultative. The new regulation is far 
from complying with the requirements of the Işık judgment44.  
In connection with the Zengin judgment, an interesting judgment by 
the Administrative Court of Antalya of 30 December 2015, recognized the 
right of atheist parents to have their children exempted from lessons in 
religious culture and ethics, on the grounds that those lessons did not 
correspond to the lessons on “religious culture and moral education” which 
are compulsory by virtue of art. 24 § 3 of the Constitution following a 
reasoning that had appeared in the old case law of the Danıştay45. 
 
 
6 - Instead of a conclusion: trying to analyse an identity crisis 
                                                             
42 Official Gazette of 7 April 2016, no. 29677. 
43 Official Gazette of 4 July 2007, no. 26572. 
44 T. ŞIRIN, “Nüfus Cüzdanındaki Din Hanesi-Eğitimde Din Dersi Zorlamaları”, in Güncel 
Hukuk, May 2016, 5/149, p. 34.  
45 T. ŞIRIN, “Nüfus Cüzdanındaki Din Hanesi-Eğitimde Din Dersi Zorlamaları, cit., p. 35. 
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The custom to indicate the religion on republican identity cards is 
inherited from Ottoman practice46, which had its reasons, since various 
religious communities of the Empire were organized according to the 
“millet” system. In civil matters, the members of each millet were 
submitted to their respective regulation, including marriage and 
inheritance laws, as well as to the jurisdiction of denominational tribunals 
whose judgments were supervised and implemented by the Government. 
The mention of religion could avoid frauds and falsifications. For instance, 
an Arab of Catholic faith, with a typically “neutral” Arab name such as 
Aziz, Malik or Khaled, could claim to be a Muslim in order to divorce, 
which is prohibited in Catholic canon law. A Greek Orthodox by the name 
of Sim(e)on could declare to be a Serbian, a Bulgarian Orthodox, or a Jew, 
according to the circumstances, in order to decline to pay the his Church 
tax. When caught drinking raki in daytime during the Ramadan, a Muslim 
named Yakub, could claim to be a Jew named Yaakov, in order to avoid 
penalties. Oddities of the Ottoman alphabet (relative absence of vowels, 
polyvalent consonants) as well as whimsical spellings of Non-Muslim 
proper names in public records could encourage such schemes. Therefore, 
the mention of religion was not only meaningful, but also necessary. 
So was it at the beginning of the Republic, since by virtue of article 
42 of the Lausanne Treaty of 24 July 1923, the birth-certificate of the 
Turkish Republic, the Turkish Government undertook, for the familiar or 
personal status of the non-Muslim minorities, to adopt all necessary 
measures in order to regulate these issues according to the customs of the 
minorities. The Lausanne minority system was, thus, supposed to be 
based partially on the Ottoman millet system47. In 1925, on the eve of the 
reception of the Swiss civil code by Turkey, a Jewish delegation sent a 
letter renouncing its rights stipulated in art. 42, and was followed by the 
                                                             
46 Interestingly, art. 3 of the last Ottoman Law on the Public Register mentions, among 
the entries to be introduced, “the religion of the Muslims, the religion and the denomination of 
Non-Muslims, and the communities the latter belong to […]”. See Nüfus Kanunu, Law 
No.1929, 5 Şevval 1332 - 14 Ağustos 1330, Published in: Takvim-i Vekayi (Official Gazette) 
on 17 Şevval 332 - 26 Ağustos 1330, and in the Düstur (Official Collection of Legislation) 2. 
Tertib, vol. II, p. 1244. Such a formula presupposes that Muslims constitute a monolithic 
(i.e. Sunni) entity whereas Non-Muslim may belong to various denominations and 
communities- a conception that has survived.  
47 S. AKGÖNÜL, “Reciprocity and Minority Religious Institutions in Greece and in 
Turkey”, in Reciprocity. Greek and Turkish Minorities. Law, Religion and Politics, edited by 
Samim Akgönül, Bilgi University Press, İstanbul, 2008, p. 154. See also: A. YUMUL, 
‘Azınlık mı, vatandaş mı?”, in A. KAYA & T. TARHANLI (ed.) Türkiye’de Çoğunluk ve Azınlık 
Politikaları: AB Sürecinde Yurttaşlık Tartışmaları, TESEV, 2005, p. 100. 
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Armenian and Greek communities.48. Putting aside the question of the 
international validity of these declarations, we may say that from 1925 
onwards, there is one, unique legislation that applies to all Turkish 
citizens, regardless of their religion or denomination.  
Since religion has no legal impact, one can wonder why its mention 
was kept in identity cards. Such mention has unfortunately detrimental 
effects in practice, especially in professional life and in the relations with 
public authorities. In order to avoid unpleasant consequences, some Non-
Muslims prefer to exhibit their driving licence before public authorities 
since it does not mention their religion. Non-Muslims are practically 
absent in the public service49, especially in judicature, by virtue of an 
unwritten rule which predetermines their professional choice50.  
The problem is closely connected with the identification of “Turk” 
with "Muslim”: Through a quite paradoxical process in a secular republic, 
religion has become a sine qua non element of the Turkish identity. Bernard 
Lewis points out that, in secular Turkey, the word “Turkish” is only 
applied to Muslims. The non-Turkish immigrant (Bosnian, Albanian, etc.) 
acquires rapidly a Turkish identity51 whereas the Non-Muslim Turkish 
citizen is socially and even legally52 considered a foreigner. The creation of 
Turkish Republic, and especially the exchange of populations53 allowed a 
former Ottoman millet, i.e. the Muslim one, to overlap geographically with 
a Nation-State. The establishment of secularism went hand in hand with 
                                                             
48 See C. BILSEL,“Medeni Kanun ve Lozan Muahedesi”, in Medeni Kanunun XV. Yıl 
dönümü için, Kenan matbaası, Istanbul, 1944, p. 43; R. BALI, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye 
Yahudileri-Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni, (1923-1945), 3rd edition, İletişim, Istanbul, 2000, pp. 
64-65; D. KAMOUZIS, “Reciprocity or International Intervention? Greek and Turkish 
Minority Policy, 1923-1930”, in Reciprocity. Greek and Turkish Minorities. Law, Religion and 
Politics, edited by SAMIM AKGÖNÜL, Bilgi University Press, İstanbul, 2008, p. 58. 
49 Two major exceptions would be medical professions and university career.  
50 R. ENDER, “Açıklamama Hakkı”, in Güncel Hukuk, August 2011, p. 59.  
51 Cf. B. LEWIS, Le Retour de l’Islam, Gallimard, Paris, 1985. 
52 See: A. ALEXANDRIS, The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 
1918-1974, Centre for Asia Minor Studies, Athens, 1992, pp. 108-111, 185; F. ÇETIN, “Yerli 
Yabancılar” (Local Foreigners), in İBRAHIM KABOGLU (ed.), Ulusal, Ulusalüstü ve 
Uluslararası Hukukta Azınlık Hakları Istanbul, Istanbul Barosu İnsan hakları Merkezi, p. 74-
75; A. ALEXANDRIS, The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974, 
Centre for Asia Minor Studies, Athens, 1992, p. 220.  
53 The Exchange of Populations Treaty signed at Lausanne on 30 January 1923 adopted 
the religious criterion for the exchangeable persons, i.e. “Turkish nationals of the Greek-
Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory and Greek nationals of the Muslim religion 
established in Greek territory” (art. 1).  
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the construction of the nation, referring to a particular religion.54 This 
mutation seems to deviate from the original republican genetics, since, in 
the very words of Atatürk: “Some say that the unity of religion is efficient in 
the constitution of a nation. But we see, the opposite in the picture of the Turkish 
nation before our eyes”55.  
Thus, in blatant violation of the social engineering program set up 
by the founding fathers of the Republic, a religion, namely Sunnite Islam 
of Hanefite rite / school, has progressively become an integral part of the 
national identity. Non-Muslims, despite being Turkish nationals, have 
been considered as foreigners and the Alevis have been simply ignored as 
a distinct religious identity or invited to join the flock. Prior to the Alevi 
cases brought before the ECHR, when Alevis asked for an authorization to 
build their own prayer houses (Cemevi), they received the same 
Aristotelian reply from different state bodies (municipality, governorship, 
Religious Affairs Directorate etc.): “Alevis are Muslim. Muslims go to the 
Mosque. Alevis shall go to the Mosque”. In the same vein, when Sinan Işık 
applied to a court requesting that his identity card feature the word 
“Alevi” rather than the word “Islam”, the District Court dismissed his 
request, on the grounds that the term “Alevi” referred to a sub-group of 
Islam and that the indication “Islam” on the identity card was thus correct. 
Initially designed as the republican establishment’s tool for 
controlling religion, the Religious Affaires Directorate has become the 
laboratory of an astonishing osmosis: In the early republican era, the 
establishment manipulated the Directorate in order to better control the 
religious feelings of the population and to avoid any deviation harmful to 
the public order and the regime. However, by adopting a reconciliatory 
discourse, the Directorate presented a curious parallelism with its 
predecessor, the office of the Şeyhülislam (the grand Mufti, highest 
religious authority issuing fatwas) and has become a zealous supporter of 
the regime56, perhaps initially as a price to pay for survival, and later, for 
                                                             
54 E. COPEAUX, “La nation turque est musulmane: Histoire, islam et nationalisme”, in 
GROC Gérard (dir.), Formes nouvelles de l’islam en Turquie. Les Annales de l’autre islam, n° 6, 
INALCO-ERISM, Paris, 1999, p. 327.  
55 A. AFETINAN, Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, 2. baskı, Türk 
Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara, 1988, s. 21 
56 See article “Shaykh al-Islam” in Encyclopédie de l’Islam, Nouvelle édition, tome IX, 
Brill, Leiden, 1998, p. 413: “Considérer la charge du mufti comme la réponse au besoin qu’avait 
l’Etat de disposer d’une personnalité religieuse distincte du gouvernement séculier, capable 
d’exprimer l’autorité de la shari’a, voire apporter une sanction religieuse au régime, permet 
d’expliquer logiquement la création de la fonction […]”.  
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power maximization. As religion has become an element of the national 
identity, the Directorate assumed the charge of a National Church. In fact, 
in terms of relationship between religion and State, what is the difference 
between the Turkish Religious Affairs Directorate and any State Church 
model in the European space? In all these cases, the structure concerned is 
integrated into the State apparatus, the ministers of the cult are civil 
servants paid by the State. The highest organs of the religious structure 
define the limits of the creed and decide what is left outside. In parallel 
with legal and political integration, religious and national identities are 
overlapping.  
In the Turkish case, one can observe the hilarious coexistence of a 
secular political and legal system with a State body fighting zealously to 
preserve the religious / national identity. As it appears in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, Greece and Turkey are facing very similar, if 
not identical problems in terms of the relationship between State and 
Religion. Greece recognizes Eastern Orthodoxy as the dominant religion of 
the State, whereas Turkey is, legally speaking, a secular State. The heritage 
of the Byzantine symphony of powers seems to be perennial in the post-
byzantine space. 
The identity crisis triggered by Mr. Işık contributes to the diagnosis 
of a legal schizophrenia. In the Middle-Ages, mental diseases were 
considered of diabolic origin and mental patients were “cured” with fire as 
witches. The regions surrounding Strasbourg were particularly infamous 
for witchcraft cases brought before local courts57. Today, the Strasbourg 
Court’s jurisprudence provides a helpful remedy to heal the disease: No 
State, not the least a secular one, can neither assess the legitimacy of 
religious beliefs nor collect religious data for legally unjustified reasons. 
Religious otherness is not an evil to be burnt, but a human choice to be 
protected by law and respected by the society.  
 
                                                             
57 See, G. BECHTEL, La Sorcière et l’Occident. La destruction de la sorcellerie in Europe, des 
origines aux grands bûchers, Plon, Paris, 1997, pp. 672-673. 
